Cognitive fluency
Integrating the
research on cognitive fluency and cognitive dissonance can enrich our understanding
of the cognitive strain (or excessive disfluency) produced by convoluted
expression. I’ve extensively
discussed research on cognitive
fluency-disfluency, whose basic lesson is that when a message is understood
effortlessly it is more believable. Daniel Kahneman in his landmark work in
cognitive psychology, Thinking, Fast and
Slow (2011) at pp. 62 – 64, provides the following advice on minimizing cognitive strain in persuasive writing:
- Maximize legibility.
- Do not use complex language when simpler language will do.
- Make the message memorable.
- Choose sources with names that are easy to pronounce.
Cognitive dissonance
The term now part of the vernacular, cognitive dissonance, a social-psychology research program started
by Leon Festinger in 1956, refers to our
aversion to disharmonious ideas, but there’s unfortunately no quick way to understand what disharmonizes ideas. You have to grasp the concept from key experiments. I
present two, displaying the breadth of the cognitive-dissonance concept:
In the “$1 and
$20 experiment,” subjects performed a boring task, which they understood as the
experiment’s real purpose, and they then sought to persuade another subject to
participate on the ground that the experience was interesting. One group was
offered $1 and the other $20 for their persuasive efforts (today’s values would
be inflated by a factor of 7.5). Both groups subsequently evaluated the boring
task’s enjoyability. The then-surprising result, as Festinger predicted, was
that the subjects receiving $1 rated the boring task more interesting than did
the subjects receiving $20. The counter-intuitiveness of the results is what
made cognitive dissonance the most popular research program in social
psychology in the 1960s: under the reigning reinforcement theory, the subjects
in the $20 condition should have rated the task more interesting, since they were
reinforced (rewarded) more for claiming it was interesting. Festinger had predicted
the results by reasoning that the subjects in the $1 condition would experience
more cognitive dissonance due to the disharmoniousness between the two beliefs: 1) they had misrepresented
a boring task and 2) they had done it for a mere dollar.
In another study, Festinger observed a group of fanatics who believed the end of
the world was nigh and sought to prepare for it. When the world didn’t end,
rather than relinquish their belief, they elaborated and deepened it by
explaining away the disconfirmation and becoming yet more fanatical. To make
their beliefs more harmonious, they construed the apparent disconfirmation as
confirmation.
While my concern
is to apply cognitive-dissonance research to cognitive strain, which is
directly relevant to writing persuasively, cognitive fluency also clarifies
cognitive dissonance, needing clarification because defining the
harmoniousness that reduces dissonance is elusive. Social psychologist Eliot
Aronson had proposed that cognitive dissonance comes from conflicts with
self-concept, but recent research hasn’t supported this interpretation: choices
affect beliefs even when the earlier beliefs are forgotten. (See Coppin et. al,
I'm No Longer Torn after Choice: How
Explicit Choices Implicitly Shape Preferences for Odors (2010) Psychological
Science 21(4) 489 ‒ 493.) Cognitive-fluency theory suggests that disharmonious
(dissonant) beliefs are beliefs whose understanding takes effort. They are
disfluent beliefs, although the disfluency arises not from the
manner of expression, as in cognitive-fluency research, but from the content of the beliefs.
Just as
cognitive disfluency is useful in
persuasion, so is cognitive dissonance,
although the uses of dissonance, like those of disfluency, have been largely overlooked.
To discourage the error of ignoring dissonance’s uses, I’ll offer a few obvious
examples supporting the position that just as there’s an optimal level of
fluency, so there’s an optimal level of dissonance needed to maintain a reader’s
interest. It’s well known that skilled readers of fiction prefer complex to
simple characters; paradox can be useful in exposition; and implausible beliefs
and even logical contradiction have helped make religions popular—as with the Trinity
doctrine.
Lessons for persuasive writing
Now for what
cognitive dissonance research implies about cognitive fluency. The research on
cognitive dissonance conceives it as a drive to reduce an unpleasant arousal
state: we’re motivated to reduce dissonance. (Kiesler and Pallak, Arousal properties of dissonance
manipulations (1976) Psychological Bulletin, 83(6), 1014 ‒ 1025.) Cognitive-fluency researchers haven’t considered the
motivation behind the preference for cognitive ease, but if cognitive-dissonance reduction is due to the motive that also enhances the believability of fluent messages, that has lessons for writers. The difference
is that cognitive strain's unpleasantness motivates the reader to reject the disfluent expression, not only to find the
fluent more credible. The analogy to cognitive
dissonance suggests that when we disbelieve the disfluent, it’s because believing
the disfluent is uncomfortable. Since we must
believe to understand, unpleasant affect associated with the effort to
understand prejudices the reader against the proposition
itself even when it’s later expressed clearly.
The implication is that persuasive writers should avoid unwarranted disfluencies even when they're immediately clarified. If a concept is hard to understand without examples, prematurely presented conceptualizations undermine subsequent understanding. It's better to introduce the examples before the proposition they support.
Cognitive strain's unpleasantness supports using the method of
successive approximations for introducing complex ideas. To use successive
approximation, the writer presents a simplified concept that is subsequently
elaborated in a series of changes, each simple enough
to avoid cognitive strain.
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