Showing posts with label construal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label construal. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 28, 2017

A Model of Persuasion

Despite our casual compartmentalization of many diametrically opposed beliefs, humans are also sensitive to cognitive dissonance that is merely mild. The theoretical resolution of this perplexity is that abstract beliefs conflict only insofar as they support opposed concrete opinions. This opens the question of the psychological nature of this support. We can simplify explanation of persuasion if we conceive of the influence of the abstracting mindset on the concretizing mindset within an individual as being the same type of influence as that of an outside persuader on another’s (abstract) beliefs. All direct influence of belief (whether the belief belongs to oneself or another) is suggestion, which in its purest form is hypnosis. The mechanism by which belief influences opinion (primarily as it relates to volition) is autosuggestion. The process by which concrete opinion directly influences other concrete opinions is the ordinary sphere of learning from experience. All this is shown in the diagram below:  



Notice that the diagram shows two routes to belief change: blue, from opinion to belief and using dissonance modulation (as well as ordinary learning); and green, from belief to opinion and using suggestion. Only the green route affords the possibility of rational belief change, and that is only a possibility. This is because logic is approximated only in the concretizing mindset.

The nature of ordinary learning isn’t itself my concern here, just the peculiar relationship between the concretizing and abstracting mindsets. Governing this relationship are two basic processes: suggestion and dissonance modulation. The main practical relevance for writers is that what works for changing belief through suggestion fails for change by dissonance modulation. For example, suggestion demands the greatest simplicity because suggestion involves bypassing the critical faculty (that is, the brain’s cingulate), and the easier a proposition is to understand, the more it is accepted automatically, since acquiring disbelief necessitates express rejection. On the other hand, effective dissonance modulation requires univocality, since without it the recipient of the influence is likely to achieve consonance through a different route than the persuader intends. The difference is that the subject of suggestion submits to influence, whereas the recipient of a communication using dissonance modulation will only accept the writer’s ideas if they are actually dissonance reducing. Imprecision arouses rather than resolves dissonance. As for suggestion, in hypnosis vague suggestions work better than precise ones. (Thus, telling subjects that that they are “going to sleep” can induce hypnosis even though hypnosis isn’t actually much like sleep.)

Conflation of suggestion and dissonance modulation runs deep. It isn’t just a matter of a superficial trend in writing pedagogy; it also afflicts those whose business it is to know better, such as social psychologists and (remarkably) specialists in hypnosis. The bias of social psychologists reflects the orientation to advertising. Although the theories of cognitive dissonance and construal level come from social psychology, the classic social psychological research on persuasion, which provides the framework for general discussions of the persuasion process, implicitly equates persuasion with suggestion. (An equation that is actually worth retaining if its limits are understood, inasmuch as the act of persuading others can be contrasted with the act of convincing them, the blue route contrasting with the green.)

The confusion is greatest within the dominant school of professional hypnotists. The font of clinical hypnosis (outside of hypnoanalysis), Eric Ericson, attributes results he achieves through the artful modulation of cognitive dissonance to some form of hypnotic suggestion. Now, here’s confusion enough to be funny. Dilbert cartoonist Scott Adams, who is a trained hypnotist (apparently of the Ericsonian persuasion), concluded that Donald J. Trump’s methods and results make him a “master persuader.” Perhaps subliminally recognizing that cognitive dissonance is the key to deep rather than superficial attitude change (which is to say, change of opinion rather than belief), Adams took Trump’s ability to use suggestion on supporters, predisposed to accept his influence, to prove Trump had mastered cognitive dissonance. Adams predicted that Trump would win in a landslide because he could hypnotize most anyone.

Lexicographers and usage experts expatiate on the distinction between the verbs persuade and convince. The distinct meanings may be on the verge of loss, but it marks an important psychological difference. According to the lexicographers, persuasion is aimed at obtaining action, as in persuading a judge to sustain a motion. Persuasion means change in belief, without any change in opinion being necessary. But you will rarely change a judge’s belief without changing his opinion. (The effect of suggestion is actually obtained primarily from respective law firms’ prestige.) So, despite the aim being to persuade judges, advocates typically must convince them—of something. For the same reason, when academics try to persuade editors to publish a paper, in the usual they must convince them, at least in the best journals. Even more than when a lawyer influences a judge, the academic must use dissonance modulation, since the practice of blind review screens out many indicia of status that are so influential in the use of suggestion.

This is a general model of the persuasion process (more precisely, of the processes of persuading and convincing) that highlights the relationship between construal-level theory's abstracting and concretizing mindsets. The two epistemic attitudes, belief and opinion, are subject to their respective modes of influence, suggestion from belief to opinion and cognitive-dissonance modulation, from opinion to belief. In the diagram the blue arrows represent the path of cognitive dissonance modulation and the green arrows of suggestion. Hypnosis is a short-cut to belief formation in that it bypasses opinion. Post-hypnotic suggestions are incorporated into the subject’s belief system, whereas the justification is extemporized when an explanation is requested. It may be easier to see the abstracting character of hypnosis in terms of the corresponding time orientation. Although hypnosis may be self-induced, the process for intentionally inducing hypnosis is first learned in the process of being hypnotized by another person and being given the post-hypnotic suggestion that the subject will be able to reproduce the state. Thus the nature of the influence is interpersonally “far.” Dissonance modulation is near because it is perceived as an internal process. It is concrete because it can be resolved into discrete discrepancies. (Dissonance supplies a metric for overall coherence based on discrete discrepancies, a topic to be visited in my Juridical Coherence blog.)

Sunday, April 30, 2017

The Role of Suggestion in Persuasive Writing: “What is Classic Prose?” Revisited


Thomas and Turner (Clear and Simple as the Truth: Writing Classic Prose) describe classic prose as nonargumentative, a characteristic both paradoxical and central. Paradoxical because another characteristic of classic prose is advocacy of a thesis, which is usually explicit. (Thomas and Turner conflate introductory exercises involving presentation with full-blooded classic prose, which is fundamentally a tool of argument.) Yet the “nonargumentative” quality of classic prose, the absence of opinionation, pleading and pressure, is unmistakeable. I contend most central in classic prose is its indifference to suggestion: refusing either to wield it as a weapon or compulsively avoid it.

Suggestion is one of the two methods by which writers can influence readers’ far-mode beliefs, the other being cognitive-dissonance modulation. Most of the popular advice about persuasion involves suggestion, my main evidence concerning communication conducive to suggestion coming from the study of hypnosis and of interaction ritual chains, both enhanced by authority, simplicity, brevity, ease, repetition, and emotional involvement. The maxims of plain-talk writing amount to a guide to the forms for persuading by suggestion.

The mentioned prototypes for suggestion also demonstrate the limitation of suggestion as a tool for persuasion. Both hypnosis and interaction ritual chains require prior commitment. Hypnosis doesn’t work against a subject’s will, and confidence in the hypnotist is one of the most important determinants of trance induction. As for interaction rituals, we see today how political rallies excite only the party’s adherents.

The reason for the limitations of communication based on suggestion is the phenomenon of reactance. Attempts at suggestion against a person’s will arouses an opposing resistance often stronger than the suggestive effect, so that the target of the communication moves, by “reverse psychology,” in the opposite direction. Today’s political polarization is associated with reliance on suggestion in campaigns: how many “We’re with her” buttons can nonsupporters see before they start hating her?

Because of reactance, writers attempting to persuade the unreceptive must forswear suggestion. That includes not only avoiding the fallacies of suggestion, such as appeals to authority, assurances of sincerity and credibility (“believe me!”), and vagueness and ambiguity, but also the formal characteristics of suggestion when embodied in prose, the plain-talk techniques developed by advertising specialists: short sentences, common words, repetition (“tell them what you are going to say, say it, and say what you’ve said”)—all of which characterize hypnotic induction. By forswearing suggestion, classic prose attempts to be maximally persuasive while avoiding reactance.

There is another stylistic approach to avoiding reactance actually more extreme than forswearing intentional suggestion: striving to eliminate as much suggestion as possible. The norms and practices of “academese” express this drive to avoid suggestive content, being a systematic display of just those forms that would be avoided in hypnotic induction: long sentences, obscure words, and passive voice. (Contrast with classic prose, where sentence length varies to serve as a tool for emphasis, words are chosen for precision, and active voice enjoys a rebuttable presumption.) “Legalese” emerges as a conflicted style. The need to prevent reactance by avoiding suggestion is expressed in the same way as in academese. But the respectability of using suggestion is greater in law than in science, with the consequence that hypnotic-like incantations obtrude, such as doublets and triplets, and other routinized phrases.

To be sure, no communication can banish all suggestion, but, unlike academese, classic prose doesn’t actually try. In fact, a cynic might contend that classic prose makes suggestion acceptable by hiding it under other stylistic effects. Classic prose disdains emotional forcefulness, for example, but classic writing is in fact forceful by virtue of its employment of emphasis through variation.

If classic prose is indifferent to suggestion, that doesn’t mean it is necessarily rational. Cognitive-dissonance modulation, the other method for persuasion, is entirely compatible with irrationality, but suggestion is incompatible with rationality. It is a form of irrational influence, whereas dissonance modulation may be rational, depending on the particularities of the discrepancies. 

Suggestion is irrational because its mechanism is the induced refusal to make a critical evaluation of the communication. The uncriticized belief is accepted as true because of the unity of comprehension and belief.

Applying the maxim that to avoid reactance use dissonance modulation rather than suggestion has an extra wrinkle for legal writing: attorneys are charged with presenting their clients’ sides. Within these bounds, some tactics arousing excess reactance are ill advised, such as obvious opinionation, exhortation, and over-simplification. And while attorneys should say clearly what they want the court to do, the phrasing “the court must…” should probably be avoided.

Tuesday, April 14, 2015

Word selection: A new principle of emphasis in near-mode

”Never use a long word where a short one will do,” is often repeated and seemingly unobjectionable advice, whose failures reveal additional principles of emphasis. Previous entries have treated far-mode emphasis, but there is also a near-mode form: emphasis by word length.

Near-mode and far-mode is shorthand for concrete and abstract construal processes in Trope and Liberman’s construal-level theory. To extend construal-level theory to phenomena beyond those studied in the laboratory, the following distinction is particularly useful: whereas near-mode adds components, far-mode averages them. (Weaver, K., Garcia, S. M., & Schwarz, N., The Presenter’s Paradox (2012). Far-mode’s proportionality seeking is the foundation of the brevity principle of emphasis. A short word will emphasize each of its component phonemes more than will a long word. This pertains to Euphony, but words are the most elementary meaningful units. Because of the additive character of near-mode, readers expect longer words to contain more information. This inference is supported by language evolution, which some researchers conclude enforces standards of communicative efficiency under which long words are less predictable than short—by that measure, conveying more information.

Readers will expect more information from longer words. Short words typically have the merit of fluency, but a judicious dispensation of long words will prepare readers for informative words, which they might dwell on a few milliseconds longer.

An example of a word choice based on its length in this entry occurred in writing this sentence: “Far-mode’s proportionality seeking is the foundation of the brevity principle of emphasis.” I considered this wording: “the brevity principle governing far-mode emphasis, but a common preposition's sufficiency shows that it doesn’t convey rich information.

A related half-truth: “Short words are powerful.” The kernel of truth in this falsehood is found in a countersignaling process: when it is very obvious that a word is important, its importance is further enhanced by omitting the signal (long word), its superfluousness itself serving as a signal of heightened importance.

Near-mode emphasis also answers another question of editorial choice: when to use phrasal verbs rather than simple verbs. Simple verbs are favored for Concision and fluency, whereas phrasal verbs lend an air of informality. But the phrasal verb occasionally serves a legitimate purpose of emphasizing the predicate. Consider this sentence: The visitor entered the office and defenestrated the occupant’s cat. The longer “threw the cat out of the window” is an example of the minority of cases where the longer verb is more fluent because it mirrors the term’s informativeness.

Tight writing is generally better than loose writing. Why? The most obvious reason is Concision, but the weightier factor is fluency—an aspect of Clarity. This analysis of near-mode emphasis explains the greater fluency of tight writing, which is due to omission of misleading cues about the informativeness of particular words. This theory of near-mode emphasis clarifies the distinction between emphases in the two modes. Near-mode emphasis concerns the amount of information; far-mode emphasis, degree of relevance.

Monday, November 3, 2014

Univocality, the highest stage of clarity


The conquest of ambiguity

Language is inherently ambiguous, but the classic-prose writing style entails minimizing conceptual ambiguity. Because precluding foreseeable confusion is the essence of communication, the highest form of clarity is univocality (unambiguousness). This isn’t widely understood, as this anecdote illustrates:
In a Stanford artificial intelligence theory class, while the prof tried to present relatively precise claims, students constantly asked if he was really trying to say distantly related claims X, Y, or Z. My exasperated friend cried "Why can’t they just treat it like math – assume nothing you are not told you can assume!" ("Against Disclaimers.")
To treat natural language as if it were an artificial language, as the anecdotal lecturer demanded, is an unhelpful suggestion because readers can comprehend only by drawing on information that seems relevant, and apparent relevance depends on the reader’s background information and intelligence. But it also depends on the writer’s univocal expression. Since more able to detect them, the intelligent reader may be particularly confused by ambiguous cues.

The quest for univocality isn’t confined to avoiding words with unwanted associations (and issuing the necessary disclaimers if that isn't possible). It rests primarily with emphasis, through means such as the new topic/stress principle, the brevity principle, and unobtrusive repetition. It also involves avoiding every manner of self-contradiction.

Varieties of clarity

The great irony in contemporary writing advice is that all extol “clarity” but none is clear on the term’s meaning. The consequence of the nearly universal failure to appreciate the different varieties of clarity causes writers to ignore some of them—particularly the most central, univocality.

These are the three varieties of clarity in writing and their definitions:

Fluency: Understanding the argument’s detail with minimal effort.

Rigor: Understanding the argument’s detail with high effort.

Univocality: Conceptually unambiguous understanding at all effort levels.

These distinctions are pragmatic rather than logical. They describe varieties of clarity furthered by different strategic choices, which advance one variety of clarity and often undermine another.

Clarity and construal level

You may be struck more by the dissimilarities between the varieties of clarity, and you will then wonder why anyone would use the same term for all of them. The common element in all varieties of clarity is their reference to the amount of relevant information conveyed, the distinctions between them concerning the amount of effort required (low or high) or the kind of information (detail or disambiguation). One obstacle is that we seem only to think of clarity as meaning one or another of its varieties, the most common interpretation of “clarity” being fluency: clear writing is understood with ease.  

An analogy might help. A drawn picture will show clarity of the fluent variety when the details can be taken in with a glance; of the rigorous variety to the extent it contains all relevant information, leaving little to guesswork or intuition: and of  the univocal variety if it doesn’t look like anything other than intended.

The varieties of Clarity have a peculiar structure predictable from  construal-level theory (as I’ve construed it). The theory varieties of clarity can be generated by crossing required effort with construal level:


Since effort—allocated in near mode—doesn’t vary in far mode, univocality depends only on construal level being abstract. The features of each variety of clarity point to how each relates to effort level and construal level. Cognitive fluency is promoted by simplicity; I’ve previously discussed its limitations and offsets. Rigor must be applied selectively. Readers use subjection to rigor as a guide to meaning, so being unnecessarily rigorous about some point distorts. Rigor is governed by two of the philosopher Paul Grice’s Maxims:

1. Be as informative as required for the purpose of the communication.
2. Don’t be more informative than is required.

Disclaimers reclaimed

Univocality is the highest stage of clarity which—its skills developed later—comes to govern the other varieties. I’ll conclude with the starting topic, the disclaimer, which has been the victim of some bad connotations due to its legalistic abuse. Disclaimers serving only to comply with (supposed) legal requirements are deplorable from the standpoint of univocality: conceptually superfluous disclaimers are not innocuous, as they distort the intended meaning.

Whether due to skill limitations, audience resistance, or nuanced message, sometimes univocality is furthered by disclaimers. Artificial intelligence, the anecdote’s subject, exemplifies a topic subject to both resistance and preconception, where conceptual disclaimers further univocality. An example of a disclaimer occurs in the present entry under the subhead “Varieties of clarity”: “These distinctions are pragmatic rather than logical.” Readers can judge whether it was helpful.

Tuesday, February 25, 2014

The new topic/stress principle: Topic is concrete, stress abstract

Recall the sequence (concrete to abstract, near to far):

conversation – informal prose – formal prose – poetry

Formal prose is a style of writing that evolved—primarily to serve abstract matters, where clarity is the central virtue—to exploit the specific virtues of written discourse. It is far-mode clarity that is most prized in this style; near-mode is essential but subordinate. To subordinate near to far, formal prose uses a characteristic device at various structural levels: new matter is introduced in far mode and developed in near mode.

At the sentence level, this is accomplished by an application of topic/stress segmentation: the stress—which introduces important new information—is abstract; the topic—which recapitulates old information—is concrete.

Definitions and principles

In formal prose (which includes the most effective legal-brief writing), the topic (usually the sentence subject) announces what the sentence is about, often through association with previous information. The stress position (I’ll continue using the term despite the technical misnomer) refers to the last word or words before a period, colon, semicolon, and sometimes a dash; it contains important new information. (We know this about topic and stress mainly due to the work of Joseph Williams and George Gopen.)

Construal-level theory links concreteness to psychological proximity and abstractness to psychological distance. In sentence processing, the topic’s position is near and the stress’s position is far, and formal prose not only honors the topic and stress positions, their contents are typically concrete and abstract respectively, to correspond with their near and far locations in the sentence. New information is first presented abstractly in the stress position and then developed concretely by being recapitulated in a more specific form in the topics of subsequent sentences.

A counter-example?

The reader expects the topic to be concrete and the stress abstract, and each receives greatest emphasis when they satisfy the expectation. This observation answers a counterexample offered by Wayne Schiess, purporting to show that the topic is more important than the stress:
To me, number one emphasizes President Bush more. 
(1) President Bush made mistakes.
(2) Mistakes were made by President Bush.
Addressing Wayne’s argument fills a lacuna in topic/stress theory: what determines the stress-position’s size? Although “President Bush” constitutes a terminal phrase in number two, that phrase—referencing a near-mode concrete particular rather than a far-mode disposition—isn’t well suited to receive stress. The reader expands the stress position to encompass a suitable abstraction, which it finds in the sentence’s predicate, “were made,” which the sentence emphasizes.

(Generalizations like this new topic/stress principle are often best used to sharpen intuition rather than to replace it. I don’t think it would have occurred to me that number two emphasizes the predicate without its aid, but once I’ve applied the principle, the intuition perseveres.)

Rewriting the “writing rules”

The new topic/stress principle grounds, consolidates, and corrects several established “writing rules.”

Avoid nominalization is one-sided over-reaction; nominalization creates far-mode abstractions, commonly suitable in the stress but not, such as to supplement an excessively abstract verb, in the topic’s vicinity.

Favor agents as subjects is a simplistic rendition of formal-prose’s preference for concrete topics.

Concrete examples should precede new abstractions describes a practice in the (informal, near-mode) plain style, unsuited for formal prose.

Wednesday, February 5, 2014

“Stress position” is a misnomer: Explaining structural emphasis

The practice of locating important new information at the end of a proposition (the “stress position”) is undervalued and misunderstood by most writing authorities, and in actual legal writing, it is rare. The widespread ignorance of the “fundamental principle of advanced writing” is illustrated by a major legal-writing teacher’sremarkable comment: “This is surely subjective, and some will disagree, but I generally teach my students to use the beginnings of sentences (and of paragraphs and of entire documents) as stress positions.” Locating what belongs in the stress position at the beginning of a sentence (the “topic”) is the most common way the stress position is ignored in professional writing.

Why hasn’t topic/stress practice penetrated professional writing? One reason I’ve suggested is that its exponents haven’t provided a compelling explanation for why stress position is emphatic; the very term “stress position” is a misnomer insofar as it is based on the stress patterns of English phonology. The most obvious point to make against the phonological theory is that English declarative sentences, in fact, don’t end in rising pitch—questions do. More importantly, where in the sentence pitch rises and where it falls depends on phonological vagaries, and for previously mentioned reasons, as well, it’s implausible that one of the two principal structural means for creating emphasis in English (the other being brevity) depends on the language’s peculiarities.

A more promising explanation is provided by Thomas and Turner, who explain stress position as deriving from an intellectual schema modeling discourse on a journey where paramount, corresponding to the stress, is destination; and a second prominent point, corresponding to the topic, is the origin. (Clear and simple as the truth (2nd ed. 2011), at p. 64.) In the Thomas and Turner view, respect for the stress position is an aspect of formal prose. But as an explanation for the role of the stress position in formal writing, it’s insufficient: it doesn’t explain why formal writing pervasively uses a particular intellectual schema, that of a journey.

Thomas and Turner have it right that the explanation for the stress position should be found, not in the idiosyncrasies of specific languages, but in the logic of formal prose. Stress position is part of the formal-writing strategy, and it transcends specific languages. (Mystifyingly, Thomas and Turner describe the “stress position” as a phenomenon specific to English.) “Stress position” isn’t an outgrowth of phonological patterns in ordinary conversation, which predominantly relies for emphasis on body language and spontaneous modulation of pitch and rhythm.

Formal prose is a specific style, one accentuating far-mode; it is a style serving to evoke receptivity to abstraction, since formal prose serves discourse about abstractions. “Far-mode” is a construct in construal-level theory, which correlates perceived physical and logical distance with abstract conceptualization. Construal-level theory entails that readers construe the beginning of a sentence concretely and its end abstractly, since, at the point where they activate a schema for understanding the sentence, its beginning (the topic) is near and the end (the stress) is far. By locating it at the end, the writer fosters an abstract construal of important new information. As a byproduct of this technique for fostering abstraction, the formal writer also gains a structural signal for importance. 

Monday, September 2, 2013

Comma usage in the context of construal-level theory


Introduction

Commas serve the following functions, in order of their importance for legal writing:

1. Increasing cognitive fluency
2. Inducing far-mode (as defined in construal-level theory)
3. Disambiguating expressions
4. Signaling competence

No one else seems to have applied construal-level theory to comma usage, and while writing authorities pay attention to the other three, the less important are typically emphasized over the more important.

Recognized comma functions

The signaling of competence includes avoiding grammatical errors that lower a lawyer’s credibility by making him look uneducated. Although sometimes emphasized even for legal writing, the importance of signaling competence is minimal because a judge is unlikely to notice the comma errors that infect lawyerly writing and lawyers are unlikely to commit gross errors, such as placing a single comma between subject and its verb or omitting a comma after a long introductory clause. Signaling might be the reason most people study punctuation mechanics, but most legal writers would do better to ignore signaling considerations when punctuating.

Disambiguation is the most emphasized function in writing advice for legal writers, and it probably is the most important function for transactional drafting. But comma usage only rarely is necessary for disambiguation, and the importance for transactional work arises from the huge potential cost of a single error. Some authorities may regale us with the legal catastrophes due to a single comma error, but in brief writing, context will usually make the distinction clear. 

There are really only two scenarios accounting for the bulk of the cases where the comma disambiguates: distinguishing restrictive from descriptive clauses and phrases and setting off a modifying phrase at a sentence’s end when the word it modifies is nonadjacent. Neither is usually truly ambiguous when you consider context. The primary role of context in drawing the restrictive-descriptive distinction can be highlighted by orthography’s not distinguishing between these types of modifiers when they occur before the word modified. In the sentence, “I love all the beautiful Russian girls,”  you can’t tell from the bare sentence whether the writer means “Russian girls, who are beautiful” or “Russian girls who are beautiful.” (HT to commenter harassmenko.) Yet writers don’t shrink from using the grammatically ambiguous expression "beautiful Russian girls." The need for setting off terminal modifiers of distant terms also rarely arises. When it does, the expressions are seldom truly ambiguous. An example is “Prosecutor Howes bribed inmate witnesses to appear, by illegally dispersing witness-voucher funds,” where the by clause modifies “to appear,” not “bribed”: nobody thinks the witnesses appeared by bribing, although that’s what the words state without the comma before by.

Rather than creating real ambiguity, the technical ambiguity instead detracts from fluency.

Increasing the matter’s cognitive fluency is really the strongest reason for good comma usage. Oxford Comma argues cogently that the importance of punctuation for fluency can be seen from punctuation other than the comma—in particular, spaces between words—because all punctuation functions for fluency. If you delete the spaces between words, it’s still quite possible, with more effort, to read it correctly. But cognitive fluency suffers greatly. The same is true, if less obviously, if you delete all commas in long sentences. Overlooking the effect of comma usage on fluency probably explains the over-statements on the comma’s disambiguation function. The comma's effect on fluency is underestimated because the comma’s effects are complex. In fact, the most salient effect of commas is that they slow readers down, a sacrifice of fluency. Too many commas as well as too few make writing unnecessarily disfluent.

Comma use to induce abstract construal

In addition to these usual functions of the comma, another is unrecognized: activating an abstract construal level (or far mode). (Construal-level theory is treated in Construal-level theory: Matching linguistic register to the case's granularity and in its series.) In legal writing and other writing intended to influence opinion about serious matters, it’s desirable to induce the reader to think more deeply rather than focus on the superficial. Since writing is largely a near-mode activity, skill in writing requires overcoming the tendency to induce the same mental set in the reader. Consider again the omission of spaces between words, as in this example (used for other purposes in Oxford Comma):

ofcourseitispossibletounderstandwhatismeantwithoutpunctuationitisntobligatoryinthatsensehoweveritisclearlyhelpfultoreaderstopunctuate

In decoding this string, you’re forced to read in near-mode, one word at a time. Spaces group letters into words; commas group words into meaningful segments based on principles of grammar, which describe how we aggregate words in comprehending sentences. Commas, like spaces, help the reader parse the sentence into comprehensible chunks, contributing not only to fluency but also to an abstract view of the subject matter. Reading in a more molar way by focusing on groups of words activates far-mode.

The prediction, based on construal-level theory, that good comma usage not only improves cognitive fluency but also induces far-mode can be tested against writers’ intuitions about comma usage. Test cases occur where comma usage disregards grammatical structure yet is more fluent. The philosopher Tyler Burge (Origins of Objectivity) is an exceptionally lucid writer, but an over-punctuation quirk in his comma usage breaks syntactic structure, although it increases fluency:

An example of empirical representation that is itself perception is a perception of, and as of, a moving silver sphere.

Burge commits the false-interjection error, but some excellent writers will agree with Burge’s version: it is more cognitively fluent than without the commas. This school of thought, ably defended in Oxford Comma, argues for a greater role for intuition in comma usage than my prescription affords. The intuition is based on cognitive fluency. Although the expression set off by commas isn’t an interjection, the sentence is easier to understand if the reader treats it as an interjection. The meaning is distorted because the punctuation treats “perception as of” as incidental compared to “perception of,” impeding a correct understanding of “perception as of,” which is grammatically and semantically coordinate to “perception of.” (If it's not semantically coordinate, the writer should use a noncoordinate grammatical form.)  

Conclusion

Intuitive punctuation has its distinguished advocates, such as Richard A. Posner, who advises legal writers to punctuate pragmatically. Construal-level theory supports the counter-argument for syntactic punctuation. 

Thursday, June 6, 2013

Self-inducing far-mode: Approaches to preliminary outlining


Since writing is an inherently near-mode activity compared to reading, the effective author will self-induce a far-mode mindset, and since you can outline in different modes, one approach is far-mode outlining. The outlining methods corresponding to modes are constructing logical hierarchies and abstraction hierarchies, and while many outlines use both methods, to self-induce a far-mode mindset you should stress abstraction level.

In a logical hierarchy, child topics imply parent topics (or the reverse) by strict deductive logic; the relationship between mathematical concepts (polygon: square) or between causes of action and their elements (defendant is liable for contract breach: defendant formed a contract) form logical hierarchies. Despite the generality of parent topics, logical relationships are near-mode: high construal (alternately, far-mode or abstract construal) denotes abstraction, not necessarily logical generality. (The distinction is a common obstacle when critics complain of construal-level-theory’s ambiguity.)

An abstraction hierarchy runs from abstract parents to concrete children, where concepts that are more abstract are those achieved by greater cognitive elaboration. (See Ulric Neisser (1967) Cognitive psychology [analysis-by-synthesis].) Abstract concepts are further removed from direct perception than concrete concepts, and it takes more intuition to apply abstract concepts than to apply concrete concepts. As the root entry on construal-level theory discussed, the death of Julius Caesar can be described at different levels of abstractness: an outline depicting them would run kill: stab: knife [verb sense]. Kill is the most abstract because sensory information about the event is removed and a conceptual framework of organisms (which can live or die) introduced; knife is the most concrete because it includes the implement.

Another contrast between a logical and abstraction hierarchies is the strict directionality the logical hierarchy alone exhibits, making it simply false to say square is polygon’s parent. Although abstraction hierarchies often have an inherent direction, purpose or context can reverse it. Stab could be made the parent of kill and wound (alternative results of stabbing), imposing a far-mode perspective on your thinking about stab.

In legal briefs, imposing far-mode can be illustrated by the relationship between issues and cases. An abstraction-level outline might include the name of an important case as the child of a parent stating an issue, but if your task were to analyze the case, the issue could be a child. Cases are inherently more near-mode than legal issues, since they’re impregnated with incidental facts, and lawyers focus excessively on cases compared to issues when they emerge from their research stuck in near-mode due to temptation by logical hierarchies. Logical hierarchies include the case-analysis protocols taught for law-school exams: holding, parties, procedural posture, facts, issues, result—lawyers stuck in near-mode overparticularize. To impose far-mode on your thinking about a concrete case, persevere in abstraction-level outlining, and treat abstract concepts pertaining to the case—such as analogies to the matter you’re briefing—as more concrete than the case itself.

Other choices influence the kind of hierarchies constructed; one is the distinction between a “mindmap” and a linear outline, and the other between topic and full-sentence outlines. A mindmap is a graphical outline radiating from a center point: the visual cues de-emphasize both hierarchy and sequence, making mindmaps more conducive to abstraction-level outlining; topic outlines are also more conducive to abstraction-level outlining, since full-sentence outlines make logical entailment more prominent.

To induce far-mode by preliminary outlining:
1. Favor abstraction-level hierarchies over logical hierarchies. 
2. Impose far-mode if your subject matter is concrete. 
3. Try "mindmapping" software.
4. Favor topic outlines over full-sentence outlines.

Friday, April 19, 2013

What is classic prose?: "Clear and Simple as the Truth” reinterpreted through construal-level theory


The book

Writing is only good or bad relative to the author's tacit stance on deep questions like whether truth is knowable, according to Francis-Noel Thomas and Mark Turner in their contrarian book, Clear and Simple as the Truth: Writing Classic Prose (2nd ed. 2011). While no style is in an absolute sense better than another, they propose to explain and teach the style “classic prose,” which they recommend for its perpetual reinvention as the instrument of choice for broad influence.

Although written mostly in classic style, the book itself is in ways disappointingly unclassic. Rather than creating an elegantly seamless work as the classic style encourages, the book is divided into three unequal parts: the Essay (captivating), the Museum (repetitious), and the Studio (painfully dull; for starter, describe a visual scene orally to a friend). 


My reinterpretation

Fortunately, construal-level theory affords insight into the mental states of writer and reader that can bypass the Studio's tedious exercises. From construal-level theory, I’ve adapted the distinction between writing that is self-contained, nuanced, and impartial (far-mode and “deeply formal”) and writing that is context dependent, simplified, and overt (near-mode and “deeply” informal). That distinction pertains to the author’s stance; another distinction pertains to the objective: influential writing might present the author’s independent thinking and seek to change the reader’s opinion or describe his considered belief, dependent on what others opine. Opinion is near-mode and is related to the words agents say to themselves in self-justification; belief is far-mode and is applied more often to others than to oneself.

The relevant styles for legal writing that Thomas and Turner present are those that respect the Writing Virtues, Clarity and Concision. The chart below depicts the relevant styles—plain, practical, and classic—each derived from a combination of the level at which the author construes the message (STANCE) and its aim (TARGET).




The difference between practical style and classic style is that practical style addresses belief and it aims, accordingly, to persuade; whereas the classic style addresses opinion and aims to convince. Thomas and Turner consider the in-house legal memorandum addressed to a superior prototypical practical style, and legal briefs, too, are mainly written in that style. The practical style in legal application doesn’t hesitate to be explicitly argumentative because the legal advocate can’t hide his partiality, as required by the classic style. Yet the more classical a brief can be made, the better; the classic style is the most effective for changing opinion. A brief must address the judge’s beliefs by citing authorities, but it will accomplish the most reliable results by reaching further to the judge’s personal impressions. Often, the facts section can be written in classic style.

Where the practical style and the classic style differ from the plain style is their self-contained deep formality. This detachment and distance is key to writing intending to be influential—whether convincing or merely persuasive—and the progressively duller second and third parts of the book attempt to teach it by having the reader master and extend the “classic visual scene,” which consists of equal conversationalists viewing the same surroundings with reciprocal knowledge of their common perceptions. The presentation of this scene, without the unarticulated gaps that pervade near-mode communication, amounts to approaching composition in far-mode. The plain style, often purveyed as the model for contemporary writers, imitates near-mode communication and lacks the detached explicitness and nuance of far-mode communication.


My advice

If you can move your legal writing toward classic prose, you will improve it, but classic prose is difficult to produce because it adapts a far-mode stance to the representation of near-mode thought, allowing its dispassionate exploration. This is unnatural to perform because in relating our opinions we naturally assume a rich, shared context. But for influential writing, classic prose ranks highest on the Writing Virtues, as this chart depicts.

The pattern above is that as the style comes to invoke an increasingly far-mode stance the writing becomes less fluent but more cohesive and selectively omissive. Near-mode thought is capable of superior articulation into parts, but far-mode affords the superior sense of a cohesive whole and inattention to the incidental. The plain to classic dimension trades off fluency for cohesion and omission, and for influential writing addressed to serious, interested readers this advances both Writing Virtues.


My conclusion

Some commentators lay great stress on the deceptiveness of the classic style, which conveys false tacit assumptions, such as the flattering appraisal that the reader is truly interested in finding truth. Construal-level theory implies these conventions are idealizations, employed by far-mode to grasp the essential and exclude the distracting. Idealization is emblematic of far-mode cognition. Thomas and Turner contend that all styles have characteristic epistemological stands, but construal-level theory implies that that idealizations aren’t as prominent in near-mode writing styles.

[Developed further in Three senses of "conversational" writing.]

Wednesday, December 5, 2012

Emphasis by brevity of sentences, paragraphs, and sections


To emphasize an idea, put it in a short sentence. To emphasize a sentence, put it in a short paragraph. To emphasize a paragraph, put it in a short section. In general,

Readers will give information relative emphasis in inverse proportion to its density.

I haven’t seen this principle articulated, and it only became apparent to me through the lens of construal-level theory; although the tip to use very short sentences for occasional emphasis is a commonplace, to use long sentences for de-emphasis isn’t. That the principle hasn’t been generalized might be because the effect is often subtle: it is only one of at least five means of emphasis, but a more interesting reason that the effect has gone unnoticed will emerge, in that the construal processes explaining emphasis by brevity also explain why writers aren’t apt to notice.

I’ll begin with an example at the sentence level. Compare this very long sentence to the constituent propositions:

With capitalism’s evolution, a decreasing proportion of the value produced is constituted of labor directly employed, an increasing proportion from labor already concretized in capital goods, since mechanization of production is the fundamental means to increasing economic efficiency, where capital goods contribute to the value of a product to the extent they are consumed in its production. (Context: Juridical Coherence.)

The simple ideas the sentence contains, such as that mechanization of production is the fundamental means to increasing economic efficiency, are commonplace ideas others have expounded at length. To subordinate their importance to the ideas I deemed novel, I demoted them by including them in one complex sentence.

Construal-level theory explains why emphasis by brevity works, by the low granularity of far-mode. The theory predicts and experiments find that reading occurs in far-mode, whereas writing occurs in near-mode (I conclude that the latter is lamentable), where far-mode apprehends in global units as we see from afar. In far-mode, each sentence has equal value; the more thoughts occurring in a sentence, the less the relative value of each. The theory also explains why emphasis by relative brevity isn’t common knowledge. Even while writing in far-mode, the writer is nearer his work than the reader because the self-other axis is a major dimension of construal level, and in near-mode, the longer sentence is more important than the shorter, rather than the reverse—near-mode adds when far-mode averages.

The phenomenon of emphasis by brevity confirms some standard writing advice and rebuts other standard advice. Commentators have expressed surprise at the degree to which variation in sentence length improves comprehension, suggesting more is at work than maintaining interest by variety. Varying sentence length makes writing clear by informing the reader how important the writer regards each component idea.

The misguided advice includes limiting sentences to one idea, implying writers should avoid compound sentences (and semicolons). Compound sentences serve to de-emphasize the ideas they contain, so their avoidance sacrifices emphatic contrast. Other misguided advice concerns paragraphs. Consistently short paragraphs have the same leveling effect on importance as consistently short sentences. And routine use of separate paragraphs for transitions between paragraphs is bad practice because the merely transitional usually doesn’t merit emphasis.

For a document’s sections, one all-too-common practice gravely offends against construal-level theory. A conclusion is almost mandatory in legal briefs and is necessarily short, but nonetheless, the emphasis it receives is often bestowed on a platitude with an initial “whereas,” in all caps no less. The better practice is to reserve a memorable idea for the short concluding section.

Tuesday, October 23, 2012

Avoiding irrelevance and dilution: Construal-level theory, the endowment effect, and the art of omission

Deciding what to omit (omission) is one of three fundamental writing skills—besides fluency and cohesiveness—supporting the two major Writing Virtues: Clarity and Concision. Although omission is a sophisticated skill not acquirable through panaceas, it is unique among the three fundamental skills because a single roadblock causes most of the congestion. The roadblock is the writer’s innate aversion to deletion; the aversion derives from a universal cognitive bias called loss aversion, meaning we’d rather maintain the status quo than bet a significant amount on the flip of a coin. (See D. Kahneman, Thinking, fast and slow (2011).) The most dramatic expression of loss aversion is the endowment effect: owners will sell property only at a much higher price than they would pay to acquire it. Loss aversion explains an impressive part of wordy or irrelevant writing because it makes adding matter easier than deleting it.

Construal-level theory is a theory about decision and judgment that explains loss aversion and teaches us how to avoid it in writing. Construal-level theory deals with the biases the distinction between practice and theory introduces into our thinking. When our objectives are immediate, the information available rich, and time bountiful, we analyze in a way of thinking called near-mode, which uses high-grain, concrete concepts and attends to incidental features. When our objectives are long-term and the information or time scant, we analyze in a way of thinking called far-mode, which uses low-grain, abstract concepts and focuses on the essential.

Construal-level theory furnishes an explanation of loss aversion and the endowment effect. (D. Kahneman, supra.) Consider a standard example of the endowment effect: a holder of concert tickets costing $50, the most the concert-goer would have paid, refuses to sell for $300. More usually, we value property about twice as much just because we happen to own it already. Construal-level theory explains loss aversion by the tendency to give greater importance to the near than the far. Analogously, we over-value what we’ve written because it’s near, and we’re loathe to part with it.

Construal-level theory has unearthed another source of our reluctance to cut inferior matter: the audience reads in far-mode, which is global, but legal writers often compose it in near-mode, which is sequential. The consequence is that the audience averages the quality of the documents’ parts, whereas the writer is apt to add their quality, meaning that, for the audience, subpar arguments detract from overall quality but, to the writer, they may seem to increase the quality. (K. Weaver et al., The presenter's paradox (Oct. 2012) 39 Journal of Consumer Research 445 [Hat Tip: Overcoming Bias].)

Construal-level theory provides insights to help writers overcome the biases implicated in writing in near-mode for an audience reading in far-mode. Writing systems involving different roles for the author, such as the roles of writer and editor, serve to vary the author’s mode. Specifically for brief writing, Bryan Garner has advanced a more elaborate system of roles, which are distinctively near and far. (B. Garner, The winning brief (1999) at p. 3) The chart below displays the Flowers roles, their typical activities, and the mode mainly engaged.

Flowers-paradigm role
Typical activities
Mode from construal-level theory
Madman
Brainstorming, “Deep thought,” background research
Far
Architect
Outlining, planning, detailed research
Near
Carpenter
Primary writing
Far
Judge
Editing, proofreading
Near

Madman is far because it encourages intuition, a far-mode product. (See G. Gigerenzer, Gut feelings: The Intelligence of the unconscious (2008).) Architect is near-mode because it accentuates logical relationships, which depend heavily on sequencing, a near-mode activity. Carpenter is far-mode because it attempts to make ideas intelligible to others. Judge is near-mode because it involves close reading for error.

The alternation of phases is powerfully effective in engaging both modes without causing the mutual interference to which they are prone when combined simultaneously. It is so effective that the modes can be seen to alternate within roles. Although Madman is predominantly far-mode, it includes periods of near-mode activity, such as close reading of selected cases. Judge, although mostly near-mode, may include far-mode phases, such as hearing the document read aloud. Carpenter and Architect usually alternate more than once, because Carpenter excels at abstraction and Architect at sequencing.

Construal-level theory offers far-mode as the remedy for excess. Because of the relationship between the endowment effect and near-mode, cutting excess is performed most effectively in far-mode, and typical problems in legal writing occur when lawyers compose their briefs in near-mode, often because they write their briefs while they read cases closely. The result is not only the absence of the big picture but also an accumulation of excess. To avoid much of this excess, learn to write in far-mode, and master the research in near-mode in the Architect phase.

Some common advice is misguided because it contributes to excess. Writers are often instructed to be Madmen in the Carpenter role, but although both Madman and Carpenter are far-mode, Carpenter provides the opportunity to pare down irrelevant matter generated in the Madman phase, and the advice to suspend the critic when doing primary writing sacrifices the main opportunity to trim excess. This shouldn’t be left to the Judge, as editing is a near-mode activity, and among the errors the Judge isn’t good at correcting is excess. The erroneous advice comes from seeing an alternation between writer and critic rather than between near-mode and far-mode.

Both far-mode phases are good for trimming excess, as the writer can take steps to stem excess in the Madman role despite heeding the advice to suspend the critic. Although this advice applies to Madman, not to Carpenter, when applied to Madman it admits critical comments. To take advantage of the Madman to combat excess, treat critical ideas related to scope and breadth just as you would any other ideas. If you’re brainstorming, if you think you’ve come up with an idea of doubtful relevance, you should note that thought alongside the idea itself. Having added exclusion as an idea, you will later be unable to avoid discarding one idea or the other, the marginal thought itself and the imperative to disregard it. Therefore, near-mode’s reluctance to part with sentences will resist rejecting the idea to discard as much as it resists rejecting the idea itself.